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ABSTRACT
The Relationship Between Casino Drop 
And Gaming Stock Performance:
A Multivariate Analysis
by
Mark Howard Gilbert
Dr. Zheng Go, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Hotel Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
In reference to the gaming industry, investors and analysts examine many different 
variables that affect the financial viability o f the business. Areas o f investigation have 
included competition, governmental regulation, debt structure, cash flow, visitor volume, 
and so on.
The purpose o f this study was to analyze the relationship o f yet another variable o f 
casino performance, the casino drop, to gaming stock performance. Utilizing statistics 
provided from the State o f  Nevada's Gaming Revenue Report, the casino drop was 
divided into five segments, blackjack, craps, baccarat, quarter slots, and dollar slots.
Tested by using a multiple regression analysis against a market capitalization- 
weighted index consisting o f  Aztar Gaming, Boyd Gaming, Harrahs Entertainment, 
MGM Grand. Mandalay Resort Group, Mirage Resorts, and Station Casinos, all five 
independent variables were proven statistically significant at a .10 confidence level. 
However, the results o f the study were deemed inconclusive due to the presence o f
ui
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negative coefficients for craps, baccarat, and quarter slots. The negative coefficients for 
these independent variables are incongruent with the underlying premise that an 
increasing drop, analogized to increasing revenue, should lead to an increasing stock 
price.
IV
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Foreword
(Author’s note: The following account was provided by a Las Vegas casino executive. 
Though the author has embellished some aspects o f  the tale, the basic facts o f  the story 
are true.)
Shoeless Joe walked into a Las Vegas Strip casino on a morning just like any 
other late winter morning a few years ago. The timing o f  his visit was coordinated by the 
arrival o f his monthly Social Security check. Since Shoeless Joe, a homeless man, did 
not have a bank account, he would make the trek to a casino to cash his only source o f 
income. The general assumption held that Shoeless Joe would immediately make his 
way to the nearest exit, only to be seen in another 30 days to cash the next month’s check. 
But, not Shoeless Joe, he was a gambler. Shoeless Joe was in a casino, and he had 
money in his pocket.
It didn’t matter that this $450 could buy him a cot and three squares a day at a  shelter 
with enough to indulge in a few vices for the remainder o f  the month. Shoeless Joe 
was a gambler. Though games o f chance had cost him his family, his friends, his health, 
and all o f  his worldly possessions, this money represented a momentary escape from a 
disheartening life on the street. Be it several hours i f  the cards were against him, or a  few 
days or a week if  Lady Luck was on his side. Shoeless Joe was simply looking for some
1
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respite from a monotonous life. However, no matter how the cards fell, long before the 
end o f  the month. Shoeless Joe would always find himself penniless.
On this aforementioned visit. Shoeless Joe sat down at a blackjack table to tend to 
his trade as a compulsive gambler. Without doubt, the dealer and fioor supervisor eyed 
this untidy individual with suspicion as he laid down over $400 on the table. Though 
Shoeless Joe didn’t exactly fit the mold o f a  properly attired casino guest, he had 
money and he wasn’t  bothering anyone. Consequently, the dealer yelled out “change”. 
Simultaneously, the supervisor responded in accordance. Little did they know that the 
exploits o f Shoeless Joe were about to become a part o f  gaming lore.
To add to the improbability o f Shoeless Joe’s tale, he had often wandered into this 
very same casino. Although, on most occasions, he had no check to cash, and had no 
cash in his pocket. Invariably, Shoeless Joe’s stay was always cut short by the forceful 
hand o f security persotmel escorting him o ff property. And, in situations that required 
additional support, namely the police. Shoeless Joe would often find himself spending 
the night behind bars. Shoeless Joe was definitely no stranger to the inner workings o f 
the local precinct as the local keeper’s o f public semblance maintained a rap sheet for 
Shoeless Joe representing iimiimerable offenses o f vagrancy, petty theft, etc. However, 
on this fateful day. Shoeless Joe would not have to worry about any brushes with the 
law. As it turns out, the only thing Shoeless Joe would have to be troubled with is what 
gourmet restaurant he would be dining at that evening.
When Shoeless Joe passed his money across the table, he requested “green” chips.
No messing around with his usual table minimum $5 bets. Shoeless Joe began by 
betting $25 a hand. In retrospect, it seems that Shoeless Joe knew something special
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
was going to happen that day. Because, with uncanny precision. Shoeless Joe began to 
win hand, after hand, after hand, after hand, 20s, 21s, blackjacks, double downs, splits. 
Everything was falling into place for Shoeless Joe. Suddenly, $25 bets turned into $100 
bets, then $500, all the way up to the table maximum. He even was going against 
conventional blackjack wisdom and winning. Hitting a “hard” thirteen against the 
dealer’s 6. Standing on “soft” seventeens. Doubling down on a hard 18, and catching a 
deuce. Nobody does that. Shoeless Joe did, and he won.
As the shift changeover from graveyard to day convened at 11 ;00 a jn .. Shoeless Joe 
had parlayed his original buy-in o f  $450 into $60,000. A return o f  over 13,000% in just a 
few short hours. Not bad for someone whose life revolved around finding a secure place 
to lay his head each night. Considering this incredible run of luck, surely Shoeless Joe 
would say “thank you very much”, and be on his merry way. Sixty thousand dollars 
could afford Shoeless Joe a fairly comfortable lifestyle considering his current 
simplistic ways o f existence. But, not Shoeless Joe, he was a gambler. Shoeless Joe 
was in a casino, and he had chips in front o f him.
Needless to say. Shoeless Joe kept playing. However, as remarkable as it sounds, 
he kept winning, and winning, and winning. By the time he had decided to call it a day. 
Shoeless Joe was surrounded by nearly a quarter of a million dollars. $250,000. Now, 
without doubt. Shoeless Joe would make like a tree and leave. However, being around 
casinos for a major portion o f life. Shoeless Joe understood there was a  game to play.
The casino was not going to let him simply walk out o f the building with that amount of 
money. They were going to do all they could to keep him in tow, a suite with all of the 
amenities, food and beverage complimentaries. Whatever it took to keep Shoeless Joe
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playing in their casino, they were going to offer it to him, within reason. Because, they 
knew Shoeless Joe was a gambler, a degenerate gambler. He was in their casino, and 
he had their money. The law o f gaming averages dictated that over a course o f time. 
Shoeless Joe wasn’t really winning, he was just borrowing the money. Or was he?
To make a long story short. Shoeless Joe’s saga took about two weeks to run its 
course. During this time. Shoeless Joe eventually ran his total winnings up to an 
astonishing $1.35 million. Wall Street could never come up with a better return in ten 
years, let alone ten days. Shoeless Joe was a millionaire, and it lasted all o f  one day. 
Shoeless Joe was a gambler, and he was in a casino. What else was he going to do 
with $ 1.35 million, walk away, buy a life that most could never afford? No. He was 
going to continue doing what he would always do. Shoeless Joe was a degenerate 
gambler.
In the end, as one could have probably guessed. Shoeless Joe returned the lion’s 
share of his booty back to the casino. Eventually, he walked into the sunset with a 
“mere” $60,000, the same amount he had won during that remarkable, initial morning.
As for the nearly $1.3 million that Shoeless Joe gave back to the casino, it was just a 
matter o f time until the mathematics o f gaming finally caught up to him.
The Shoeless Joe case illustrates two key elements o f the casino business. The first 
component concerns the short-term volatility o f the business. Lee (1991) explains that 
when a casino caters to the high-roller segment, or in this case the Shoeless Joe market, 
there is the possibility of negative revenue days. Though every game in a casino, table or 
slot, has a built-in house advantage that warrants long-term profitability, short-term 
anomalies can occur. And, this not only holds true for one player, but potentially for an
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entire company, or market, o r overall industry. However, over the course o f a financial 
quarter or year, the impact o f  a  high-roller wül be smoothed by other high-rollers, as well 
as the thousands o f smaller bettors. This second factor pertains to the long-term 
profitability o f the industry, as over the long haul, normalized standards will always 
prevail.
Statement o f the Problem
Wall Street, in its attempt to accurately forecast the financial future o f  the gaming 
industry, scrutinizes many variables. Areas o f  analysis include debt structure, 
competition, governmental regulation, win percentage, visitor volume, and so on.
Though all o f these components contribute extensively to the bottom line, no other 
figure has a greater bearing on the profitability o f gaming than “drop”. Though 
interpretations vary on its calculation, drop corresponds to the amount o f  money 
wagered in a casino.
Given the basic fact that casinos hold a definitive mathematical advantage over the 
gaming patron, the primary goal o f  casino management is to provide and maintain an 
enticing atmosphere for players to enter the “betting circle”. As long as casino 
management can elongate the gaming experience for existing players, while attracting 
previously inexperienced gamblers to the casino floor, gaming revenue will continually 
increase.
Though drop provides a key barometer for casino profitability, analyzed exclusively, 
is it also as important to the industry’s analysts and investors? More precisely, is there 
a correlation between casino drop and the volatility o f a gaming stock index?
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Specifically, this study will investigate the correlation o f casino drop to gaining 
stock prices between the period o f January 1994 to June 1999. This will be accomplished 
by applying casino drop figures from the state o f Nevada to an index o f  seven gaming 
firms that comply with the prerequisites o f the study. Additionally, the total drop will be 
broken down into five areas o f  interest, blackjack, craps, baccarat, $0.25 slots, and $1.00 
slots. The purpose o f the dissemination will further examine the potential effect o f each 
component on the variability o f stock price index.
Justifications
Van Horn (1995) states that the primary objective o f a company must be to create 
value for its shareholders. If  the correlation of the volatility o f a gaming stock index and 
the variance o f drop proves to be a positive one, then the results can offer gaming 
managers, investors, and hospitality researchers a better comprehension o f the risk 
characteristics o f the gaming industry. Also, given the ultimate goal o f a firm’s 
executives to increase shareholder wealth, this study will assist in developing 
strategies designed to maximize revenue potential, and thus enhance the value o f  the 
company.
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Hypothesis
To examine the relationship o f gaming stock price volatility and gaming drop, a 
multiple regression equation is formulated using a combination o f six independent 
variables, five related to casino drop, and an overall market index applied as a controlling 
function, and a dependent variable. Each coefficient (Ai) indicates an individual 
parameter o f the multiple regression equation.
Y = Ao + AiXi + A2X2 + A3X3 + A4X4 + A5X5 + AeXe + Ei 
where:
Y = market capitalization-weighted gaming stock index;
Xi = overall market index;
X2 = blackjack drop;
X3 = craps drop;
X4 = baccarat drop;
Xs  = quarter slots drop;
X6 = dollar slots drop;
Ei = the error about the regression line.
Based upon the above multiple regression equation, the following six null hypotheses 
will be tested. The rejection o f the null hypothesis would imply that the applied 
independent variable is statistically significant and affects the gaming stock price index in 
a negative or positive maimer.
Null Hvpothesis #1:
There is no significant relationship between the overall market index and the 
market capitalization-weighted gaming stock index.
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Null Hvpothesis #2:
There is no significant relationship between blackjack drop and the market 
capitalization-weighted gaming stock index.
Null Hvpothesis #3:
There is no significant relationship between craps drop and the market 
capitalization-weighted gaming stock index.
Null H\'pothesis #4:
There is no significant relationship between baccarat drop and the market 
capitalization-weighted gaming stock index.
Null Hvpothesis #5:
There is no significant relationship between quarter slots drop and the market 
capitalization-weighted gaming stock index.
Null Hvpothesis #6:
There is no significant relationship between dollar slots and the market 
capitalization-weighted gaming stock index.
Delimitations o f the Study
For the purpose o f this study, gaming figures from the state o f Nevada were utilized 
exclusively. Though Nevada dominates the gaming industry in terms o f total dollars 
wagered in one single market, a better representation could have been obtained by 
including New Jersey, Mississippi, and all other domestic gaming jurisdictions.
In addition, there is a marked discrepancy in the comparison o f casino drop statistics 
and the sampled gaming stock index. While the drop totals of all 370 nonrestricted
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gaming locations in Nevada were utilized, the seven firms that compose the index 
represented less than 50% o f  the state’s gaming revenue.
Limitations o f the Study
The selection of a gaming stock index proved to be a daunting task. Though the 
equity market, as well as individual analysts, offer a wide array o f  options, the index 
employed in this study was constrained by the following parameters:
1. The index should include companies whose primary gaming interests are in 
Nevada.
2. Those included companies should be involved in the operation sector o f gaming, 
rather than gaming equipment manufacturers.
3. To obtain a proper amoimt o f  data sets, those indexed companies should have been 
traded publicly for at least five years.
Based upon these prerequisites, all o f  the most commonly recognized gaming indexes 
could not be used. The Chicago Board o f Exchange’s GAX gaming industry index was 
excluded for a number o f reasons. First, the index contained three companies which did 
not fall into the previously stated parameters, as International Game Technology and 
Anchor Gaming are manufacturers, and Trump Hotel and Casino Resorts does not 
compete in the Nevada market. Secondly, the structure o f the GAX has changed 
somewhat dramatically since its inception in January o f 1994. Originally, the index 
consisted o f fifteen companies, whereas today, the index tracks only eleven. Mergers and 
acquisitions (Caesar’s, Rio, Showboat), relegation to small capitalization status 
(President), commencement o f  public trading (MGM Grand), all have contributed to a 
diverse, yet untrackable source, for this study o f gaming index volatility.
Another potential source o f  gaming market indices are maintained by industry
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analysts. For example. Jason Ader o f Bear Steams, publishes three indices that track 
large cap, small cap, and equipment companies in the gaming segment. For the purpose 
o f  this study, the large cap index would have been the most applicable. However, o f  the 
six companies, two were rejected. Sun International, though in the process o f purchasing 
the Desert Inn from Starwood, does not currently compete in the Nevada market, and 
Park Place Entertainment, the spin-off gaming arm o f Hilton has only been traded 
publicly since the beginning o f 1999.
Definitions
Beta: This term depicts the sensitivity of a security’s returns compared to the returns 
o f  widely-held market index. In numerical terms, the beta for the market index will 
always be 1, as it is correlated against itself. The beta for the security can be greater than 
or less than 1, based upon the volatility of the security’s systematic risk.
Diversifiability: The portion of unsystematic risk that can be eliminated by 
diversification.
Drop: Kilby (1998) defines drop with regard to type o f device. For slots, it is the 
total amount o f currency and coin removed from bill acceptors and the drop bucket 
located at the base o f the machine. For table games, it is the total amount of currency and 
chips removed from the drop box along with credit issued at the game.
Handle: Freidman (1974) defines handle as the total value o f  all wagers a customer 
makes. For slots, this figure is obtainable due to the player-tracking systems installed in 
today’s machines. However, for table games, this number is not available because o f  the 
inconceivableness o f recording each customer’s wagers
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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High-roller: Contingent upon the casino, the term describes a  premium player who is 
willing to wager up to the house maximum betting limit.
House advantage: This phrase indicates the mathematical advantage the casino has 
over the player. For the traditional table games, Kilby (1998) explains that the house 
advantage ranges from less than 1% for single-deck blackjack, to 5.24% for double-zero 
roulette. For slots, the house advantage descends from the lower denominational 
machines, approximately 8-9% for nickels games, to approximately 3% for large 
denominational devices ($25 and up).
Return: For calculation purposes, return is the ending price o f a  security during a 
specified time period, minus the beginning price, divided by the begiiming price.
Risk: The sum total o f systematic and unsystematic risk measured by variance.
Systematic risk: The portion o f risk that is attributable to the overall market variance, 
conditioned by world and domestic economic environments measured by beta.
Unsystematic risk: The portion o f risk that is attributable to managerial and financial 
decision-making o f a firm.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Introduction
The review of related literature attempts to provide historical content to casino stock, 
price volatility and the cyclical nature o f casino drop. Unfortunately, previous analysis 
o f the relationship of the two variables has not been undertaken. Therefore, the subject 
matter of this chapter will be presented on a mutually exclusive basis.
Additionally, the variables will be further segregated by the origination o f analysis. 
Casino stock price variance is presented from an academic perspective, whereas the 
subject of casino drop is assessed from the publications o f gaming industry investment 
analysts.
Casino Stock Price Assessment
Any analysis o f stock price encompasses two primary measures, return and risk. 
Return refers to the performance o f  the security over a given time period, while risk, 
also denoted as standard deviation, calculates the variance. A third standard of 
evaluation, beta, which is a derivative o f the standard deviation, calculates the volatility 
o f a stock against a market index, such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average or the 
Standard and Poor’s 500. These measures, either alone or in combination, provide the 
basis of assessment for this study’s review o f casino stock related literature.
12
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The most comprehensive examination of casino stocks, in terms o f the length of 
analysis, was produced by Goodall (1994). Goodall reported on the movement patterns 
o f gaming stocks compared with the Dow Jones Industrial Average between 1973 and 
1992, roughly the first twenty years that gaming stocks were traded publicly. Dividing 
the period into six distinct stock market cycles, the study suggested that gaming stocks 
tended to be more volatile, in advancing as well as declining periods. Figure 2-1 
illustrates this greater variability o f  gaming stocks as related to the market index.
In his summary, Goodall suggests that stocks o f  smaller companies tended to be more 
volatile when compared to those o f  larger ones. While today, gam ing  companies 
certainly equal the size and structure o f those in other established industries, back in the 
I970’s and 1980’s, gaming firms were relatively small. Goodall referred to the research 
o f Malkiel (1975) and Dremen (1982) in establishing this fact.
Furthermore, Goodall, in justifying the return and risk patterns o f  gaming stocks, 
states that gaming stocks advanced or declined in directions opposite to the general 
market due to industry-specific events. An example o f  this occurred during the period of 
1976 to 1982, a term o f languishing overall market returns. However, for the gaming 
sector, the approval o f casino gaming in New Jersey provided a  major impetus for 
gaming stocks to move against the overall market trend.
Finally, Goodall concluded that despite this greater variance o f gaming stocks as 
compared to the overall market, the average return for the observed gaming stocks far 
exceeded the returns o f the indexed market. Goodall stated that the average annual return 
for the Dow Jones Industrial Average was 6.1% for the 1973 to 1992 term, whereas the 
return for gaming stocks was 17.7%.
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Gu (1994) expanded the scope o f analysis in evaluating the investment achievements 
o f the casino industry for the period 1983 to 1992, by introducing two performance 
indexes. It should be noted that Gu also analyzed the investment performance of the 
hotel and restaurant segments o f the hospitality industry, but, for this study, only the 
casino results will be scrutinized. Sharpe’s Index and Treynor’s Index, which are 
derivations of return and risk, allow potential investors to quantify the trade-off between 
return and risk by assigning a value to the expected reward o f the security. While 
Goodall’s results offered comparative information o f  return and risk, the study does not 
render a conclusive statistic o f  corresponding risk adjusted return. On the other hand, Gu 
submitted decisive deductions concerning the give and take o f return and risk by utilizing 
the indexes.
The performance index developed by Sharpe (1966) is represented by the mean return 
of an asset, minus the risk-free return, divided by the standard deviation o f the return o f 
the asset. By evaluating the total risk, Sharpe’s model is best suited for the assessment of 
a single asset fund, or portfolio consisting of similar industry assets. The premise being 
that the market-related systematic risk cannot be diversified away since the assets 
comprising the portfolio are subject to identical market trends and variance.
The ratio developed by Treynor (1965) is quite similar to the former, in that the only 
variation is in the composition o f the denominator. Sharpe utilized the total risk of the 
asset, represented by the standard deviation, whereas Treynor employed only the 
systematic risk o f the asset, or the beta. The principle applied by Treynor is that the 
unsystematic risk of the individual security will be diversified away by possessing many 
different securities, and is designed for investors who possess assets o f varying industries.
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The results o f Gu’s investigation remained consistent with the findings o f  Goodail. In 
focusing solely on the casino sector o f  the study, the mean monthly return outdistanced 
the market index (Standard and Poor’s 500) by 71%. However, these results were 
accompanied by a  decidedly larger standard deviation, 0.0742 for the casino sector 
versus 0.0070 for the market index.
By applying the performance indexes to the initial findings of return and risk, Gu 
revealed that the casino’s high return outweighed the sector’s high risk, when compared 
to the overall market performance. Table 2-1 illustrates the casino segment’s superior 
index rating when judged against the overall market index, as well as the hotel and 
restaurant sectors.
Table 2-1
Hospitalitv Investment Performance Indexes H 983-1992)
S & P 500 Casino Hotel Restaurant
Sharpe’s Index 0.0933 0.1110 0.0016 0.0789
Treynor’s Index 0.0032 0.0053 0.0001 0.0036
Source: Gu (1994). “Hospitality Investment Return, Risk, and Performance:
A Ten-Year Examination”, p. 23.
In summating his results, Gu suggested that the casino segment’s high return, as 
dictated by its propensity for high profit margins, combined with its high degree o f risk, 
provides an attractive investment opportunity for z^gressive, high-yield investors.
In comparison to Gu’s ten-year analysis, Atkinson and LeBruto (1995) present a rather
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simplistic one-year assessment o f the attractiveness o f gaming stocks. Using 1993 
as the year o f  investigation, Atkinson and LeBruto calculated the weekly mean return 
and standard deviation for twelve firms related to hotel/casino operations, four gaming 
equipment manufacturers, and five companies who they identified as the casino 
management segment. Additionally, Atkinson and LeBruto determined the betas for the 
21 firms in relation to a general market index, the Standard and P oors 500, and a 
gaming-specific indicator, the Barron’s Casino Group Index.
Consistent with the previously defined studies, Atkinson and LeBruto found that the 
mean return and standard deviation were greater than the market index. Yet, when 
compared with the industry index, the sampled firms provided a  smaller return with a 
larger amount o f  variance. Interestingly, Atkinson and LeBruto do not attempt to explain 
the cause for the variations from market index to industry index.
For the next step of the analysis. Atkinson and LeBruto described a  retum/risk 
ratio termed the Reward Ratio. Without adjusting for the risk-free rate, or identifying the 
type o f risk utilized, as specified by Sharpe and Treynor. Atkinson and LeBruto simply 
divided the mean return by the standard deviation to determine the Reward Ratio.
The usefulness of Atkinson and Lebruto’s is compromised by an inaccurate 
statistical calculation. Referring to Table 2-2, Atkinson and LeBruto s descriptive 
measures for the average o f all 21 companies, the S & P 500, and the Casino Industry 
Group Index, there is an incorrect figure in the matrix.
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Table 2-2
Descriptive Stock Return Measures o f  the Casino Industry (1993)
Mean Return Standard Deviation Reward Ratio
Average of Firms 0.0085 0.0990 0.0859
S & P 500 0.0012 0.0106 0.1132
CIG Index 0.0093 0.0451 0.0262
Source: Atkinson and LeBruto (1995). “Gaming Stocks: Hot or Not?” p. 36.
Dividing 0.0093 by 0.0451, the Reward Ratio for the CIO Index should yield 
a figure of 0.2062, instead o f  the published 0.0262. Thus, this inaccuracy leads to 
erroneous conclusions deduced from the study. The authors state, “ 15 o f the 21 firms had 
a Reward Ratio greater than the second comparative index, the CIG” (Atkinson and 
LeBruto, 1995), whereas, by applying the correct figure to the Reward Ratio of the CIG 
Index, only two o f the 21 firms surpass the figure o f 0.2062.
The final study reviewed investigates the relationship between financial ratios and the 
unsystematic risk o f gaming firms (Kim, 1996). Though the actual correlation o f 
financial ratios to risk is not readily applicable to the focus o f  this study, Kim also 
examined the systematic risk, unsystematic risk, and diversifiability o f  selected gaming 
companies.
For the study, Kim utilized 35 gaming firms that operated either traditional 
hotel/casino(s), water-based casino(s), or slot routes. Stock return data, collected on a 
weekly basis for a three-year period from January 1992 to December 1994, provided the 
foundation for analysis.
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Though principally concerned with the risk, results o f the individual firms, Kim 
provides a cumulative mean return, standard deviation, and beta for the entire sample as 
compared to his market index, the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index.
Table 2-3 reveals that the casino industry’s lower weekly mean return was accompanied 
by a higher standard deviation. Thus, the casino industry’s beta o f 1.7929 indicates that 
gaming stocks were systematically riskier than the overall index during the period of 
study.
Table 2-3
Return and Risk Features of the Casino Industry (1992-1994)
Casino Industry NYSE Index
Return 0.0019 0.0034
Standard Deviation 0.0115 0.0075
Beta 1.7929 1
Source: Kim (1996). Risk Features and Relationship Between Financial Variables and 
Beta: An Analysis o f the Casino Industry, p. 55.
In terms of the total risk associated with investment performance, Kim’s research 
offers a unique view o f the gaming sector’s ratio o f systematic and unsystematic risk .
By calculating the diversifiabilty, or the portion o f risk that can be eliminated by 
diversification, a better understanding o f  the risk nature of gaming is identified. Kim 
found that his sample’s mean diversifiability was 0.92, or that 92% o f the industry’s total 
risk was caused by firm-specific factors, as compared to 8% attributable to market
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factors. These figures denote that the stock returns o f the gaming industry tend to be 
more susceptible to firm-specific risk when contrasted against the typical security. This 
claim follows Van Home’s (1995) assertion that the unsystematic risk o f the standard 
stock accounts for approximately 70% o f the total risk, or variance, o f a  stock.
Casino Drop
Goodail (1994), in his conclusions, comments on the relative insignificance o f gaming 
stocks in the 1970’s and 1980’s, based upon the comparative small total capitalization 
o f the gaming industry. However, fi’om 1982 to  1994, the gaming industry experienced 
tremendous development as gross annual revenues rose 266%, from $4.2 billion to $15.4 
billion (International Gaming and Wagering Business, 1995). According to Boushy 
(1993), many factors contributed to this exponential growth of gaming. One o f the key 
points was the transformation o f casino ownership from thinly-veiled covers o f organized 
crime to widely-held, multinational corporations. Corporations that were legitimized by 
being publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, etc.
As the public’s perception o f gaming changed from a back-alley ritual to an 
acceptable form of entertainment, so did the public’s acceptance of gaming stocks.
Soon, gaming securities became a part o f mutual fimd, retirement fimd, pension fimd 
indices.
With the rise o f gaming stocks came the necessity for investment banking firms to 
develop the vocation of the gaming industry investment analyst. Consequently, 
individuals such as Jason Ader o f Bear Steams, Harry Curtis of BancBoston, Joe 
Coccimiglio o f Prudential, Brian Egger o f Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Bruce Turner o f
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Salomon Brothers, have become household names within the financial circles o f  the 
sector.
To include all o f the thoughts and ideas o f each one of these analysts would prove 
informative, but redundant. Thus, to limit the section on casino drop to a concise, yet 
truncated segment, only the publications o f three analysts will be included, Todd Jordan 
o f Raymond James & Associates, Jason Ader, and Brian Egger.
The vast majority o f gaming investment publications generally do not examine 
specific topics of the business, such as casino drop. Rather, they fbcus their direction 
on the many macro-market indicators, and their effects on industry-wide, as well as 
individual firm financial performance.
From a market perspective, Jordan (1999) cites critical demand trends o f  visitor 
volume and airline passenger traffic as key determinants in spurring stock movement.
For example, Jordan comments on the incredible growth that the Las Vegas market has 
experienced in the first and second quarters in 1999 in both of the aforementioned trends. 
Justly, the advances are due in part to the wave o f must-see properties that have come on­
line in late 1998, and early 1999 on the Las Vegas Strip. However, as any analyst will do 
to cover their bases, Jordan tempers his optimism by stating that "it will take some time 
for the market (Las Vegas) to fully absorb the new supply" (Jordan, 1999).
From an individual firm perspective, Jordan initially reports on the financial condition 
of the company, along with projected figures for range of stock, growth rate, and earnings 
per share. From this numerical examination, Jordan then submits a pro and con approach 
to his analysis. Concerning Mirage Resorts, Jordan comments on their disappointing 
second quarter performance o f 1999, and infers what factors drove the company’s
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earnings per share to 50% below 1998 figures. Conversely, the analysis then remarks on 
Mirage's strong position for the long term, and that the company is continually forward 
looking in its approach to expanding into other gaming jurisdictions.
For firms that have posted above consensus predictions for the second quarter o f 1999, 
namely MGM Grand, Mandalay Bay, Harrahs, and Station Casinos, Jordan commends 
them for their continued diversification o f  gaming properties outside the Las Vegas 
gaming market. Because, as mentioned previously, Jordan remains cautious o f Las 
Vegas conditioned upon the market's room inventory increase o f  15% by the time the 
new Aladdin opens in May 2000.
Regarded as the top gaming analyst, Jason Ader o f Bear Steams presently publishes a 
bi-weekly Gaming Intelligence Report, complete with market recap, stock performance, 
valuation summary, and current business related statistics. Though practically void o f 
text, the Intelligence Report provides an ample array o f graphs and charts describing the 
trends o f  the industry.
In terms of casino drop. Figure 2-2 illustrates a breakdown o f  drop, hold, and hold 
percentage for the month of June 1999, and year-to date for the Las Vegas Strip (Ader 
1999). The figures show a total drop increase of 29.1% over June 1998. Additionally, 
the year-to-date numbers signal a  13.0% growth in drop over the same six-month period 
in 1998.
Ader offers some dialogue on the state o f the Las Vegas Strip by reporting that the 
increase in table game drop, excluding baccarat, is due in part to higher-end players 
shifting their play firom baccarat to blackjack, craps, roulette, etc. However, Ader fails to 
acknowledge the presence of three major additions to the Strip, namely the Bellagio, the
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Venetian, and Mandalay Bay. When compared to the same period one year prior, these 
megaresorts undoubtedly contributed dramatically to this increase.
In the middle caption o f Figure 2-2. Ader continues his assessment o f Strip revenue 
by concluding that baccarat revenues appeared to be the primary driver o f growth in 
June, with revenue increasing 31.7%. However, revenue did not increase 31.7%, it was 
the hold percentage that increased 31.7%. Coupled with a drop decrease o f 19.0%,
Strip baccarat revenue only grew 14.0% for June 1999 (Nevada Gaming Revenue Report, 
1999).
Discrepancies in Ader’s figures and the Gaining Revenue Report may have occurred 
in the definition o f Las Vegas Strip properties. For the Gaming Revenue Report, the 
Strip is outlined as those locations within the boundaries o f Clark County that generate 
$72 million or more in revenue. Bound by these parameters, the Gaming Revenue Report 
lists 72 units of baccarat in its analysis. On the contrary, Ader reports statistics on 85 
units in his summary of the Las Vegas Strip. It appears that Ader extends his sample o f 
baccarat play beyond Mandalay Bay to the south, and the Sahara to the north. However, 
in his investigation, he does not offer any explanation to his methodology.
Another cause for disparity in the examination o f casino drop occurs in the 
calculation of the figure. The Nevada State Gaming Control Board includes in its 
definition of drop the value o f credit markers redeemed at the gaming table. That is to 
say, when a player requests a marker (credit) at the table, the player has the option o f 
paying back the marker at the table, at the casino cashier, or at a later time predisposed by 
their credit obligations. When a marker is redeemed at the table, some casino companies 
such as Mirage Resorts, do not include these redeemed markers in their drop totals. Yet,
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other casino firms do include the issuance o f  credit in the drop total as the credit 
transaction mirrors the cash transaction in that gaming chips are given to the player in 
both instances.
To uniformly account for the varying policies on marker redemptions, analysts will 
estimate casino drop figures through the Gaming Revenue Report, company guidelines, 
and their own inferences. Though most analysts do not explicitly explain the formulas 
utilized in their assessment, at least some, such as Brian Egger o f Donaldson, Lufkin & 
Jenrette will provide key assumptions included in his examination.
While continuing to comment on the financial state o f  the industry, Egger has made 
the Las Vegas baccarat market his primary focus o f  analysis. In March o f 1998, with the 
impending opening o f Bellagio looming just months away, Egger (1998) published a 
baccarat market share study. The publication estimated the effect Bellagio would have 
on other historical baccarat operators, conditioned by the soft economic conditions o f  the 
Far East, the principal feeder market o f Las Vegas’ high-rollers. Egger projected that 
though Bellagio would cannibalize approximately 20% o f  the market, its presence would 
expand the market by 5% by serving as a beacon for increased visitation.
Spurred by a recovery in several key Asian financial markets, as well as stronger than 
expected gaming activity sparked by Bellagio’s initial marketing efforts. Table 2-4 
illustrates an overall market gain o f 17% in baccarat drop for the first quarter o f 1999 
(Egger, 1999).
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Table 2-4
Las Vegas Baccarat Win and Drop Analysis
1®̂ Quarter 1999 % Change
Win Drop Win % Win Drop
The Bellagio $33 $118 28.0% NA NA
The Mirage 22 79 28.0% -26% -29%
MGM Grand 22 104 21.0% 142% -10%
Caesars Palace 27 84 32.1% 42% -10%
Rio Hotel and Casino 8 42 20.0% 33% 0%
Other Casinos 33 99 33.7% 16% 10%
Total Las Vegas Market $146 $525 27.7% 56% 17%
Note: Figures are in millions. Percentage changes compares 1999 statistics to 1998. 
Source: Egger (1999). “High-Roller Highlights: DLJ’s First Quarter 1999 Baccarat 
Market Study Reveals Better-Than-Expected Gain in Drop, Only Moderate 
Cannibalization.” p. 9.
Further examination of Table 2-4 shows that Bellagio impacted the Mirage’s baccarat 
results tremendously, as drop declined 29%. The impact was expected as Mirage 
Resorts invited many o f  its Mirage players to Bellagio. Excluding the Mirage, the overall 
market cannibalization was not as severe as Egger had predicted. Instead o f  the 20% 
estimation, the market only suffered a 10% aggregate baccarat drop decline o f those 
casinos prior to the October 1998 opening o f Bellagio.
When compared to Nevada’s Gaming Control Board figures, Egger’s first quarter
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drop increase o f 17% equals the Gaming Revenue Report’s growth for the Las Vegas 
Strip. Egger explains that he utilizes the Gaming Control Board’s statistics for the 
market total, and that the formulation o f a company’s contribution is based on the 
individual corporate definition o f  drop.
Summary
As explained in the Introduction o f  this Chapter 2, academicians and analysts have yet 
to combine their mutual reverence for gaming securities to produce a study correlating 
gaming stock price performance and casino drop figures. While academic research 
tends to concentrate on the results o f the industry’s stock performance, investment 
research tends to focus on the individual factors affecting these results.
However, a brief foray by Kim (1996), stating that “high operating income, and high
predictability of cash flow have positively influenced casino stock prices,” illustrates
some convergence o f thought between the two schools of research. Operating income 
and cash flow both are a component o f revenue, and in the casino business, drop is 
revenue. The inference can be made that an increasing casino drop should lead to an 
increasing stock price.
An example o f this basic concept is evident in Egger’s (1999) report on the resurgence 
of baccarat drop for the Las Vegas market in the first quarter o f 1999. This 
development, combined with the observed incremental increases o f other macro-market 
indicators such as airline passenger volume, visitor counts, and overall gaming revenue, 
Egger raised the industry investment rating firom market performance to outperform.
Thus, some semblance o f credence can be given to this study’s assumption that there is a
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significant correlation between casino drop and gaming stock prices.
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CHAPTERS
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction
The purpose o f this study is to examine the relationship between five areas o f  casino 
drop, an overall market index, and a market capitalization-weighted index o f  gaming 
stocks. This chapter introduces and explains the procedures in obtaining the necessary 
data, and the methodology in producing the results.
The chapter is organized as follows:
1. Composition o f sample gaming index
2. Time frame o f the study
3. Data collection and analysis procedure
4. Pearson’s correlation coefficient test
5. Multicollinearity test
6. Multiple regression for testing the relationship
Composition o f Sample Gaming Index
In reiteration o f the parameters placed on the study's index as stated in the 
Limitations section o f Chapter 1, included gaming companies should:
1. Derive a substantial amount o f their revenue fr̂ om Nevada-based operations.
29
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2. Be involved in the operational sector o f the industry, as opposed to the gaming 
equipment manufacturing sector.
3. Be a publicly traded company for at least five years.
Ideally, the goal o f the investigation intended to include an established gaming index 
as its basis for investigation. However, upon initial examination, it was evident that this 
was not possible. Potential selections, such as the Chicago Board of Exchange's G AX. 
gaming index, or the Las Vegas Sun's gaming index were disqualified for violating one or 
more of the parameters. Additionally, indexes published by industry analysts, such as 
Jason Ader of Bear Steams, or by industry periodicals, such as the International Gaming 
and Wagering Business, were excluded for many o f the very same reasons.
Thus, the composition o f sample firms was derived from a combination o f large 
capitalization and small capitalization gaming stocks, as prescribed by Ader (1999). In 
selecting four firms from his Large-Cap Gaming Index, and four firms from the Small- 
Cap Gaming Index, the sample companies were able to meet the standards prescribed by 
the author's criterion. Table 3-1 reveals the seven selected companies, their primary 
area(s) o f operation and percentage o f  revenue from Nevada operations.
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Samnle Gamine Companies
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Company
Sector of the 
Gaming Industry
Percentage o f Revenue 
from Nevada Operations
Aztar Casino 32.02
Boyd Gaming Casino, Riverboat 59.15
Harrahs Casino, Riverboat 39.71
MGM Grand Casino 95.96
Mandalay Resort Casino 87.75
Mirage Resorts Casino 100.00
Station Casinos Casino, Riverboat 63.86
Note: Revenue figures are based upon first quarter 1999 results 
Source: Raymond James & Associates (1999). “Gaming Quarterly Q2”.
Unfortunately, the restrictions placed upon the examination eliminated properties 
under the Park Place corporate flag. The Las Vegas Hilton, Flamingo Hilton Las Vegas, 
Flamingo Hilton Laughlin, Reno Hilton, Ballys, Paris, and the soon-to-be Caesars Palace 
could not be included in the study since Park Place, a spin-off o f Hilton Hotels, only 
began trading publicly in January 1999.
Other significant contributors to Nevada’s gaming revenue, including Coast Casinos’ 
Barbary Coast, Gold Coast, and Orleans, and the Imperial Palace, were omitted due to 
private ownership.
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Time Frame o f  the Study 
This study examined monthly gaming stock price returns for the period o f January 
1994 to June 1999. The beginning term o f study was constrained by Boyd Gaming’s 
public offering o f stock in the last quarter o f 1993 (Boyd Gaming, 1999).
Casino drop figures, obtained from the State o f  Nevada’s Gaming Revenue Report, 
were utilized from November 1993 to June 1999. The variance o f dates, January 1994 
for the gaming stock index to November 1993 for the casino drop statistics, was due to 
the utilization of the Gaining Revenue Report’s three-month summary o f  gaming figures. 
Consequently, the January 1994 Gaming Revenue Report includes cumulative drop 
statistics for January 1994, December 1993, and November 1993. The usage o f  the three- 
month summary is further explained in the Data Collection section o f this chapter.
In reporting the state’s gaming numbers, Nevada’s Gaming Control Board releases 
information on a two-month delay. For example. May 1999 gaming statistics were 
released on July 7, 1999. Initial thought, on the part of the author, determined that for the 
purposes o f this study, the sampled gaming stock prices were to be compared to casino 
drop figures two months previous. Thus, in compensating for the aforementioned delay 
of information, investors and analysts would have full disclosure o f casino drop 
information.
However, in an efficient capital market, investors and analysts are privy to knowledge 
on an immediate basis, not on a two-month delay. Stock prices instantly and fully reflect 
all relevant information o f a firm that is available to the public (Copeland and Weston, 
1983). Hence, this study will abandon the author’s initial supposition, and compare 
corresponding monthly information.
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Data Collection and Analysis Procedure 
The stock price data for the seven sampled gaming companies, and the overall market 
index (Standard & Poor’s 500) was obtained from the financial section ofYahoo.com. 
Figures were attained by using the closing price on the last day o f  trading for each month. 
The gaming stock prices were adjusted for stock dividends and splits during the period of 
analysis. Additionally, the index was weighted based upon the market capitalization of 
the individual firm. For the years 1994 to 1998, the average o f  the beginning fiscal year 
and ending fiscal year market capitalization was calculated to derive the portion o f each 
company’s contribution to the weighted index. For 1999, only the beginning fiscal year 
market capitalization was used in this determination.
The casino drop data was acquired from the State of Nevada’s Gaming Control 
Board. The Board publishes a monthly Gaming Revenue Report that details financial 
statistics from all state gaming locations. For this study, revenue numbers from all 370 
nonrestricted gaming locations were used. Nonrestricted gaming locations are those 
establishments that have more than fifteen or more gaming devices.
Within the Gaming Revenue Report, gaming figures are presented in monthly, three- 
month. and twelve-month summaries. To smooth out the random fluctuations caused by 
the volatility o f gaming revenue, the three-month summary was utilized in this 
examination.
In addition, gaming figures are further dissected in the Gaming Revenue Report 
by the type of table game or slot. For this study, numbers for blackjack, craps, baccarat, 
25 cent slot, and $1 slot, are applied. Based upon the June 1999 report, these five outlets 
o f chance represented 69.5% o f the total gaming win for the state. Though the Gaming
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Revenue Report does not publish drop statistics, the figure can be calculated by dividing 
the win amount by the win percentage, two statistics that are included in the publication.
Furthermore, casino drop figures were deseasonalized to allow for period-to-period 
comparisons that are more meaningful and can help identify whether trends exist 
(Anderson, Sweeney, and Williams, 1998). Spurred by such special events as the Super 
Bowl in January, Chinese New Year in February, and the NCAA men’s basketball 
championship in March, drop statistics tend to be incrementally larger during the first 
half of the calendar year.
Deseasonalization is derived by dividing the monthly results by a corresponding 
seasonal index. The seasonal index is deduced by calculating the monthly centered- 
moving average, dividing the monthly data by the centered-moving average, and then 
taking the average of these results.
Lastly, the inclusion of the S & P 500 as an independent variable in the multiple 
regression model will act as a control function for the gaming stock index. Although 
Kim (1996) found that 92% o f the total risk associated with gaming stocks was attributed 
to firm-specific events, the overall market index will account for the systematic risk of 
the sampled gaming securities.
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients Test 
To measure the strength o f the linear relationship between a dependent variable and 
the independent variable, a Pearson correlation coefficient test is utilized (Norusis, 1997). 
The purpose o f the test is to examine the one-on-one relationship between the casino 
stock index and an independent variable, at the interval level.
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When examining the Pearson correlation coefficient, the null hypothesis indicates that 
the result is equal to 0 (Norusis, 1997). If the null hypothesis is rejected, it is highly 
probable that there is a linear relationship between the dependent variable, and the 
selected independent variable. The two-tailed t-test was performed at a 10% confidence 
level, which is an appropriate significance level for this study’s exploratory 
research.
Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity, measured by tolerance, determines the strength o f the linear 
relationship among the independent variables (Norusis, 1997). The figure represents 
the proportion of variability not explained by the linear relationships with the other 
independent variables.
Since the measure is a  proportion, the values range from 0 to 1. A measure close to 1 
indicates an independent variable whose variability is minimally explained by the other 
independent variables. A value close to 0 indicates an independent variable whose 
linearity is a combination o f the other independent variables. When the latter occurs, 
multicollinearity is likely present in the data. Though confidence levels are not 
calculated, the benchmark for tolerance is typically defined at 0.1, or below (Norusis, 
1997).
Multiple Regression for Testing the Relationship 
The ultimate test o f this study is to examine the relationship between a dependent 
variable, and six independent variables. A multiple regression analysis is performed to
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produce a t-test statistic that will determine if  the individual drops o f blackjack, craps, 
baccarat, $0.25 slots, and $1.00 slots, and an overall market index, are statistically 
significant with the movements o f  a gaming stock index.
The multiple regression was performed using the statistical software program, SPSS 
8.0 for Windows. In the analysis, SPSS calculates a number o f  data sets, including a 
model summary, analysis o f variance, and regression coefficients. Though all o f  the 
statistics offer insight into the equation, the two-tailed t-test within the coefficients 
section is used to test the six null hypotheses. I f  the observed value o f  the test statistic 
o f an independent variable falls beyond the rejection region, the null hypothesis is 
rejected, with a .10 probability o f Type 1 error. Conversely, if  the observed value falls 
within the rejection area, the null hypothesis fails to be rejected.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS 
Introduction
In the previous chapter, the methodology and procedure for the data analysis was 
discussed. In this chapter, the results o f  the data analysis are presented, ultimately 
leading to the rejection or acceptance o f the null hypotheses described in the multiple 
regression model in Chapter 1.
Initially, the descriptive statistics o f the study are offered to provide an overview o f 
the data set. Then, the data generated by Pearson’s correlation coefficient will illustrate 
the strength on the linear relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables, individually. Next, the results o f the multicollinearity test are 
presented to illustrate the proportion o f variability o f each independent variable that is not 
explained by its linear relationship with the other independent variables. Finally, the 
results o f the multiple regression are presented in examining the statistical significance o f 
the six independent variables to the dependent variable.
Descriptives
Table 4-1 summarizes the descriptive statistics o f the gaming stock index, the overall 
market index, and the drop figures for blackjack, craps, baccarat, quarter slots, and dollar 
slots. The minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation o f the dependent and the
37
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six independent variables are presented. The purpose of providing the descriptive 
statistics to define the numerical parameters o f the study.
For the gaming stock index, the figures are presented as a market capitalization- 
weighted index. The overall market index, the S & P 500, is presented by the raw price of 
the index. Lastly, the casino drop statistics are represented by the deseasonalized three- 
month summary from November 1993 to June 1999.
Table 4-1
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std Dev
Gaming Stock Index 15.02 33.77 23.55 3.79
S & P 500 444.27 1,372.71 781.32 279.47
Blackjack 1,633,176 2,164,806 1,822,157 124,439
Craps 656,837 843,616 709,088 38,659
Baccarat 622,608 1,179,514 834,227 124,544
Quarter Slots 9,636,404 11,614,400 10,772,713 541,151
Dollar Slots 7,672,368 8,730,962 8,322,454 241,170
Note. Figures for the drop statistics are in thousands (add 000).
Pearson’s Coefficient Correlation 
Table 4-2 illustrates Pearson’s correlation matrix the examines the strength o f the 
linear relationship between the dependent variable and each independent variable. The 
results show coefficients o f -.255, -.178, -.317, .158, -.195, and .296, for the
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S & P 500. blackjack, craps, baccarat, quarter slots, and dollar slots, respectively. The 
coefficients for the S & P 500, craps, and dollar slots are shown to have a  statistically 
significant linear relationship with the gam ing  stock index, while the remaining three 
independent variables, blackjack, baccarat, and quarter slots failed to reject the null 
hypothesis.
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Table 4-2
Pearson's Coefficient Correlation Results
Gaming Stock Index
S & P 5 0 0 -.255
(60)
P = .039
Blackjack -.178
(60)
P = .153
Craps -.317
(60)
P = .009
Baccarat .158
(60)
P = .206
Quarter Slots -.195
(60)
P = .116
Dollar Slots .296
(60)
P = .016
Note. Each row shows the coefficient, degree o f freedom, and two-tailed significance at 
.05 confidence level, respectively.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
Multicollinearity
Table 4-3 shows the results of the tolerance test, which examines the strength o f the 
linear relationships among the six independent variables o f  casino drop. Ideally, the 
tolerance figures should be larger than .10, as variables computed below this threshold 
indicate a potential multicollinearity problem. Since the tolerance statistic for the S & P 
500, blackjack, and quarter slots fall below this benchmark, special consideration must be 
given to the variables when reviewing the results o f the multiple regression model.
Table 4-3
Tolerance Statistics
Variable Tolerance
S & P 500 .035
Blackjack .062
Craps .132
Baccarat .625
Quarter Slots .044
Dollar Slots .263
Multiple Regression 
Table 4-4 shows the results o f  the multiple regression analysis investigating the 
relationship between the gaming stock index, the overall market index, and the five areas 
of casino drop.
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Table 4-4
Multiple Regression Results
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Probability
Constant 46.862
S & P 500 171.40 2.395 .020
Blackjack 3.390E-05 2.670 .010
Craps -l.lOE-04 -3.769 .000
Baccarat -4.65E-06 -1.211 .231 .
Quarter Slots -4.42E-05 -4.255 .000
Dollar Slots 1.297E-05 4.328 .000
-statistic) = .000;
degrees of freedom = 60; rejection region; t > 1.282 or t < -1.282 at 
the .10 significance level.
Referring to Chapter 1, a null hypothesis was formulated for each o f the independent 
variables to test the significance of the correlation to the dependent variable. The first 
research hypothesis examined the relationship o f an overall market index to the gaming 
stock index. The t-test suggests that the coefficient o f the S & P 500 is significantly 
different from zero at the .10 significance level (see Table 4-4). Thus, the null hypothesis 
can be rejected. The S & P 500 is significantly correlated with the gaming stock index 
for the period o f examination.
The next null hypothesis tested analyzes the relationship o f blackjack drop to the 
gaming stock index. The t-test suggests that the coefficient o f blackjack is significantly
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different from zero at the .10 significance level (see Table 4-4). Thus, the null hypothesis 
can be rejected. Blackjack drop is significantly correlated with the gaming stock index 
for the period of examination.
The third null hypothesis tested analyzes the relationship o f craps drop to the gaming 
stock index. The t-test suggests that the coefficient o f craps is significantly different 
fi’om zero at the .10 significance level (see Table 4-4). Thus, the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. Craps drop is significantly correlated with the gaming stock index for the 
period of examination.
Before continuing to the following null hypothesis test, attention must be given to the 
negative status of the craps coefficient. Conventional thought would indicate that the 
coefficient be positive, as an increasing drop would increase the value o f the index. 
Conversely, the regression model’s assertion is that an increasing craps drop will have a 
negative effect on the price o f the gaming stock index. Additionally, the coefficients of 
baccarat and quarter slots also exhibit the same negative condition. Reasoning for this 
quandary will be offered in Chapter 5.
The fourth null hypothesis to be tested considers the relationship o f baccarat drop to 
the gaming stock index. The t-test suggests that the coefficient o f  baccarat is not 
significantly different fi-om zero at the .10 significance level (see Table 4-4). Thus, 
the null hypothesis fails to be rejected. Baccarat drop is not significantly correlated with 
the gaming stock index for the period o f  examination.
The fifth null hypothesis to be tested considers the relationship o f quarter slots to the 
gaming stock index. The t-test suggests that the coefficient o f quarter slots is 
significantly different fi-om zero at the .10 significance level (see Table 4-4). Thus, the
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null hypothesis can be rejected. Quarter slots drop is significantly correlated with the 
gaming stock index for the period o f examination.
The final null hypothesis to be tested considers the relationship o f  dollar slots to the 
gaming stock index. The t-test suggests that the coefficient o f dollar slots is significantly 
different from zero at the .10 significance level (see Table 4-4). Thus, the null hypothesis 
can be rejected. Dollar slots drop is significantly correlated with the gaming stock index 
for the period o f examination.
Summary
The descriptive statistics o f  the study varied by a range of 55% for the market 
capitalization-weighted gaming stock index. The minimum value o f  15.02 occurred in 
September 1998, a period o f trepidation for the industry as concerns over the influx of 
five megaresorts to the Las Vegas market would oversaturate the gaming supply. The 
maximum value o f the index, 33.77, followed the openings o f the Monte Carlo and the 
Stratosphere in May 1996.
Further examination o f the descriptive figures illustrate a relatively large standard 
deviation for baccarat, when compared to the other drop numbers. Approximately equal 
to the standard deviation for blackjack, the baccarat statistic is associated with a mean 
(834,227) that is over half as small as blackjack’s mean (1,822,157). This greater 
volatility exhibited by baccarat serves as a precursor for the variable’s non-significant 
relationship with the dependent variable in both Pearson’s coefficient test and the 
multiple regression analysis.
The results o f the t-test in the multiple regression suggest that the overall market index
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was significantly correlated with the gaming stock index. In addition, drop figures for 
blackjack, craps, quarter slots, and dollar slots were also significantly correlated with the 
gaming stock index. However, the findings were tainted by the negative status o f  the 
coefficients for craps and quarter slots, as the assumption o f the study dictates that the 
independent variables would provide a positive relationship with the dependent variable.
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CHAPTERS
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary
The primary purpose o f this study was to examine the relationship between a market 
capitalization-weighted index o f seven gaming firms and six independent variables, five 
components o f casino drop, blackjack, craps, baccarat, quarter slots, and dollar slots, and 
an overall market index, the Standard and Poor’s 500. Encompassing the period of 
January 1994 to June 1999, the study sought to determine the significance o f the 
relationships by utilizing a multiple regression analysis.
The results o f the investigation showed that there was a significant relationship 
between the dependent variable and five of the six independent variables, at a .10 
significance level. Shown to be statistically significant, the S & P 500, blackjack and 
dollar slots were positively correlated with the gaming stock index, whereas craps and 
quarter slots were negatively correlated. The only independent variable found not 
significantly correlated with the gaming index was baccarat. Since no previous empirical 
studies were found in examination of gaming stocks and casino drop, inferences into the 
validity o f this study cannot be made.
The existence of negative coefficients in the regression results signal potential 
validity problems in the model due to the presence o f collinearity. An increasing drop, 
which can be analogized to increasing revenue, would seem to precipitate an increasing
46
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
stock price. Thus, the negative coefficients present in the craps and quarter slots 
variables appear to be erroneous, as the figures indicate a decreasing drop would 
increase the stock index.
In an attempt to revert the two coefficients in question from negative to positive, 
statistical adjustments were made. Original figures were subjected to moving averages, 
quarterly versus monthly statistics, and lagging. Also, to compensate for the 
multicollinearity results which indicated that the S & P 500, blackjack, and quarter slots 
fell below the acceptable standard o f .10, a regression was executed excluding the 
transgressed variables. In addition, the drop totals o f blackjack and quarter slots were 
combined to potentially offset the low tolerance statistics. However, all efforts proved 
ineffectual as the modified regression models provided similar negative coefficients.
Conclusions 
The conclusions for this study are as follows;
1. The results of the study are valid. Therefore, gaming operators should focus their 
managerial attention on blackjack in the table games department, and dollar machines 
in the slots department. Some sense o f credibility can be given to this analysis as 
blackjack is far and away the most lucrative table game in terms o f  win amount to the 
State o f Nevada. According to the June 1999 Gaming Revenue Report, blackjack 
accounted for 38.2% o f the total table game win, whereas the next closest game in win 
amount, craps, accounted for 15.4%.
Additionally, when compared to other “mass market” denominational devices, namely 
nickel and quarter slots, dollar machines outdistance the competition in terms o f  win 
amount per unit. Dollar slots contribute $3648 per unit, compared to $2379 for quarters.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
and $1906 for nickels, according to the June 1999 Gaming Revenue Report.
2. The results o f the study are invalid. Though the correlation was proven to be 
statistically significant for every one o f the six independent variables, the results were a 
product o f “dumb luck”. Since three o f the six variables provided coefficients that 
were negative, the data defies reasonable thought that to increase the drop (revenue),
a firm's stock price would actually decrease.
3. The results o f the study are inconclusive. As stated in the previous two summaries, 
the findings o f the study, while offering information that could potentially be useful to 
gaming operators, are burdened with questions concerning its validity.
Comparing the results o f Pearson’s coefficient correlation and the multiple regression 
analysis, the existence o f alternating positive and negative coefficients signals unreliable 
results. For example, when examining the one-on-one linear relationship o f  blackjack to 
the gaming index, the correlation produces a negative coefficient. Yet, when blackjack, 
combined with the linear relationships o f the other five independent variables in the 
regression model, yields a positive coefficient. Under normal statistical circumstances, 
one would expect the coefficients to be consistent, either in the positive or negative.
Another problem in the findings o f the study involves the effects o f  multicollinearity. 
Norusis (1997) states that when collinearity is present, the results may encounter 
coefficients with the wrong sign, and the recommendation is made to remove the 
offending variables fi-om the model. Nevertheless, the removal o f  the S & P 500, 
blackjack, and quarter slots rendered similar coefficients.
However, when the casino drop totals were regressed cumulatively with the overall 
market index, the analysis provided useful data. Though not statistically significant at the 
.10 confidence level, the coefficient was positive for the total drop amount for blackjack.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
craps, baccarat, quarter slots, and dollar slots. This finding provides some glimmer o f 
optimism for future research in the relationship of casino drop and gaming stock 
performance.
Recommendations for Future Research 
In order to examine the relationship between the variance o f gaming stock prices and 
industry financial variables, future studies can utilize several other revenue-related 
determinants. For example, casino revenue (win), win percentage, cash flow (EBITDA), 
profit margin, etc., all could be used in conjunction with a cumulative drop figure to test 
for the significance, as related to gaming stocks, o f various revenue-related variables.
In replicating the aim o f  this study, the scope o f the investigation should be refocused 
to fully reflect the intent o f  the study. Instead o f including all of the nonrestricted gaming 
locations in the state, a better representation would be to just include the Las Vegas Strip 
market in future research. For example, with respect to baccarat, the Strip accoimted for 
84% of the statewide win amount according to the June1999 Gaming Revenue Report.
By including statewide figures, the effects of baccarat, as compared to the other 
independent variables, are diffused.
Further support to the exclusive utilization o f the Las Vegas Strip market involves the 
composition o f the index. For the last month o f the study, Jimel999, the four large-cap 
Strip operators contributed 95% to the market capitalization-weighted gaming stock 
index, compared to 5% for the three small-cap operators. In addition, in future studies, 
when more data becomes available, this percentage will significantly rise due to the 
inclusion of Park Place Entertainment.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
Finally, the breadth and depth o f future study can be expanded. Though somewhat 
constrained by the availability of stock price data, the breadth o f future research could be 
elongated to a longer period o f analysis to sufficiently observe the relationship o f gaming 
stock prices and casino drop statistics. The depth o f future research can be achieved by 
including additional table games and denominational machines in the study.
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